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Abstract 
 
  The current Air Force logistics operations system is reactive in nature, 
meaning that after the aircraft detects a part failure, the maintenance person must perform 
fault isolation procedures and then steps are taken to repair or replace the faulty item.  
This may or may not include ordering of a replacement item from base supply.   The 
Autonomic Logistics System (ALS) concept changes this reactive process into a 
proactive one with the employment of technologies such as prognostics and distributed 
information network.  This new approach to the logistics process shows the potential for 
cost savings, increased aircraft operational availability, and better system performance.   
The ALS basic function can be compared to the human body’s nervous system.  
The body’s nervous system performs activities automatically or without constant thought 
like respiration and blood circulation.  This same concept can be applied to the Air Force 
logistics system.  Certain logistics tasks can be handled automatically or autonomously.  
Ordering parts for a broken system, calling the right maintenance specialist to the right 
aircraft reporting a problem, notifying the maintenance control center that a certain 
aircraft has a malfunctioning system and will not be available for the next sortie, and 
other possible applications.  Since the ALS can handle these routine tasks, the 
maintenance personnel are free to perform more important tasks such as maintaining and 
repairing the jets.  
This thesis explores the impact of this concept on the aircraft sortie generation 
process by building a discrete event simulation tool to allow the study of the baseline 
existing system and the ALS. 
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SIMULATION OF AUTONOMIC LOGISTICS SYSTEM (ALS) SORTIE 
GENERATION 
 
 
 
  
I.  Introduction 
 
The Air Force needs tools that allow analysis and evaluation of newly emerging 
operational concepts.  This thesis builds such a tool through the use of modeling and 
simulation.  This tool will help decision makers perform what-if analyses to determine 
whether these concepts will provide benefits over current systems.  These benefits may 
include, a cost savings, increased operational availability, and better system performance. 
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft program office is developing a newly 
emerging operational concept called the Autonomous Logistics System (ALS).   The 
program office is in the system development and demonstration phase of the program 
with Lockheed Martin as the prime contractor.  This new logistics system shows the 
potential for great savings over the current way the Air Force conducts logistics 
operations by employing emerging technologies such as prognostics and making use of a 
distributed information network to accelerate the information flow.  This thesis builds a 
discrete event simulation tool of the current sortie generation process and the new ALS to 
allow comparisons to be made between two systems; the current maintenance system and 
the ALS.   
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Background 
The current Air Force logistics operations system is reactive in nature, meaning 
that after the aircraft detects a part failure, the maintenance person performs fault 
isolation procedures and then any steps to repair or replace the faulty item.  This process 
is usually started when the aircraft detects a fault, which sets a flag and sends a notice to 
the pilot.  Depending on the severity of the fault the mission can continue and the 
information is saved for maintenance debrief.  The new ALS is a proactive approach to 
the logistics operations.  Meaning that when the same scenario takes place, a number of 
actions will automatically kick-off.  They include, but are not limited to, isolating the 
fault, taking the necessary actions to work around the problem and possibly continue the 
mission, notification of ground personnel, ordering the equipment and right personnel to 
repair the aircraft, and if necessary, even ordering a replacement part from base supply.  
This new process will make the jet more reliable and easier to maintain and will also 
make the weapon system more affordable.   
The JSF is not the only program addressing these new technologies; other 
organizations are investigating this new logistics concept.  The Air Force Research 
Laboratory (AFRL) is investigating whether a prognostics and health management 
(PHM) system, the heart of the ALS, can have a have significant impact to the current 
aircraft fleet i.e. F-16, F-15, C-5, C-17, etc.  Also, the Army and Navy are placing a 
Health Usage Monitoring System (HUMS) on their helicopter fleet.   
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Autonomic Logistics 
To understand an ALS, consider the basic functions of the human body’s nervous 
system.  The body’s nervous system performs activities automatically or without constant 
thought like respiration and blood circulation.  This same concept can be applied to the 
Air Force logistics system.  Certain logistics tasks can be handled automatically or 
autonomously.  Ordering parts for a broken system, calling the right maintenance 
specialist to the right aircraft reporting a problem, notifying the maintenance control 
center that a certain aircraft has a malfunctioning system and will not be available for the 
next sortie, are some of the possible applications.  Since the ALS can handle these routine 
tasks, the maintenance personnel are free to perform more important tasks such as 
maintaining and repairing the jets.   
The heart of the ALS is a fully functional PHM.  The PHM can detect aircraft 
system faults, perform on-board diagnostics and fault isolation, and delay maintenance if 
a system can either be reconfigured or is not required for the next mission, and report its 
status and findings.  The other key system for the ALS is the Distributed Information 
System (DIS).  This is the information side of the ALS.  It makes available the PHM data 
to all the appropriate logistics functions, keeping them informed of status and making 
requests for parts, manpower and equipment if the situation needs these items. 
 
Previous work 
Rebulanan (2000) and Malley (2001) conducted initial thesis research into the 
ALS and PHM systems respectively.  Rebulanan constructed an Autonomic Logistics 
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simulation called ALSim as a tool to allow comparison between ALS and the current 
maintenance process.  His research showed that higher aircraft availability could be 
obtained with an ALS.  Malley (2001) built on that research by adding more detail to the 
PHM capability in ALSim.  The PHM capability utilized inputs from notional JSF 
sensors and employed an artificial neural network to predict remaining service life.  Both 
programs were written in the JAVA® programming language. 
   
Discrete Event Simulation Model Development 
The research conducted in this thesis will look more in-depth at the failure 
information and will take a different approach to the model building.  The model is built 
in Arena®, a discrete event simulation software package.  The model is structured to 
allow easy insertion of new objects that are deemed appropriate for implementation.  The 
model will include many aspects of a minimal, yet effective, ALS, assumed present at the 
base level.  This will allow comparison between current system procedures and the 
envisioned ALS of the future.  Sensitivity analysis of the model will pinpoint areas of 
greatest concern and potential.  The simulation tool will examine an Air Expeditionary 
Force (AEF) scenario.  A wing working in an AEF scenario needs assurance that their 
aircraft can safely and effectively perform the deployed mission without a great deal of 
last minute inspections and parts swapping.  This simulation tool can help ascertain if the 
deployment will function smoothly in the tightly constrained AEF deployment time 
block.  Once the units have deployed, the simulation tool can help ascertain if supply and 
maintenance will be able to plan for: 1) component failures, and 2) when and where the 
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components should be delivered thus minimizing man-hours, cost of spares and 
transportation, and reducing the on hand valuable components.   
 
Aircraft Sortie Generation Process 
Aircraft maintenance is the heart of flight line operations and it of course takes the 
most time.  The sortie generation process has been the same for many years.  It takes 
several different specially trained personnel to generate an aircraft for the day’s mission.   
The process is cyclical in nature; Figure 1 shows the typical process. 
 
 
Figure 1. Sortie Generation Process 
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The starting point is generally considered to be the aircraft landing.  After moving 
to the parking location and engine shutdown, post flight servicing is conducted, while the 
aircrew conducts their debriefings to the maintenance crew.  Numerous routine 
maintenance functions are required to ready the jet for the next mission, plus any 
unscheduled maintenance derived from the recorded faults collected during the flight.  
The aircraft are prepared for flight by the ground crews, the pilots load the assigned 
mission, take-off, perform the mission, and land to the complete the cycle. 
The ALS hopes to make positive impacts on this process.  These impacts should 
come via more information sharing, better information, and more timely information.  
The box in Figure 1 indicates where the ALS will have the greatest impact.  This will also 
be the place that we will focus our modeling efforts.     
 
Problem 
Air Force decision makers need a simulation tool to study the effects of the 
emerging Autonomic Logistics System (ALS) technologies on the Air Force’s sortie 
generation process.  This discrete event simulation model will facilitate quick turn studies 
providing concrete measures of performance.   
 
Research Objective 
The model will be developed in Arena® with extensive use of dynamic graphics 
to allow for better definition of required objects and interactions.  The modules from 
Arena® will be written such that object-oriented code may be quickly developed from the 
model. 
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Scope 
This research will develop a discrete event simulation model to emulate the 
effects of a baseline sortie generation process and a fully operational Autonomic 
Logistics System (ALS) to include a prognostic and health management  (PHM) system 
and distributed information system (DIS) at the base level.  This model will lay the 
groundwork for an object-oriented model that will eventually give decision makers the 
ability to simulate existing and emerging aspects of the Autonomic Logistics System 
(ALS). 
The baseline scenario is the existing organization level logistics operations.  The 
model is structured to allow for easy incorporation of additional or updated objects (such 
as types of aircraft, maintenance equipment/process, refueling equipment/process, 
operating locations, etc.)  The model focuses on the F-16 aircraft and the radar subsystem 
more specifically using actual data from the F-16 radar systems that are flying at Hill 
AFB, UT.  The code is constructed to ensure easy reusability for other aircraft or 
subsystems that a user wishes to consider.     
 
Thesis Organization 
 This thesis is organized in five chapters.  The second chapter contains a detailed 
literature review on the following subjects; Sortie Generation, Autonomic Logistics, 
Health Usage Monitoring System, and other simulation programs.  
 Chapter three describes the methodology that went into development of the 
Arena® sortie generation model and where the data was obtained.  Chapter four contains 
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the results from the simulations while the fifth chapter includes conclusions and 
recommendations for future research.  
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II. Literature Review 
 
Introduction 
This literature review examines the research that defines the sortie generation and 
the autonomic logistics processes.  Defining these processes will help with the model 
development discussed in chapter 3.  This chapter also includes discussions of the two 
key ALS components PHM and DIS, another PHM system (HUMS), condition-based 
maintenance (CBM), and other simulation packages that were located during the 
literature review.   
 
Sortie Generation Process 
As discussed in Chapter 1 the sortie generation process involves several factors 
and entities.  The requirements for maintenance and the sortie generation process are 
found in AFI21-101 (2002:12), “Aircraft and equipment readiness is the maintenance 
mission.  The maintenance function ensures aircraft and equipment are safe serviceable, 
and properly configured to meet mission needs.”  Flight line maintenance includes 
processes to inspect, service, and maintain aircraft on the flight line.  An important factor 
in maintenance is knowing the status of the aircraft to include the systems and 
subsystems that make up such an aircraft.  Today’s maintainers rely on the on-board 
diagnostics to indicate a problem during post flight servicing and inspection.  Only after 
this notification can they then undertake the fault isolation and repair process.  As 
discussed in the next section, ALS equipped aircraft will conduct a majority of these 
tasks autonomously while at the same time keeping the maintainers informed of weapon 
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system status, making their job a great deal easier by pointing to specific parts that 
require replacement or indicating when such maintenance is required.  As indicated in 
Chapter 1, we wish to identify time savings due to an ALS system, as well as other 
benefits from such a system.    
Figure 1 defines the sortie generation process; an ALS can have a positive impact 
throughout the process.  Starting at the top of Figure 1, the landing procedure, an ALS 
equipped aircraft can relay critical system information while the aircraft waits for the 
runway to become available and after landing while it taxis back to the parking location.  
Currently, some aircrews report the aircraft status over the radio, giving the ground crews 
a head start on the repair process.  However, this status usually only includes the 
maintenance fault lists (MFL) flags.  After engine shutdown the aircrew may conduct a 
short discussion with the ground crew before heading to the mission debrief area.  During 
parking and recovery, the aircraft is prepared for ground operations, and aircraft servicing 
commences.  This servicing includes checking fluid levels and refueling the aircraft.  
During the aircrew debriefing, involving the aircrew and maintenance personnel, any 
discrepancies are discussed, documented, and placed into a computerized information 
system, in the F-16 case the Core Automated Maintenance System (CAMS).  The 
maintenance personnel are looking for both current faults and repeat faults.  Next, if 
required, a maintenance crew heads to the aircraft to conduct the repair to return the 
aircraft to operational status.  This is referred to as unscheduled maintenance since these 
faults occur over the course of the sortie mission, meaning maintenance was unplanned.   
Figure 2 shows the possible steps in this maintenance process. 
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Figure 2. Unscheduled Maintenance Process 
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isolation can be frustrating and time consuming.  However, with accurate PHM, the 
correct item is removed and replaced the first time. 
The next step may involve preventative maintenance and periodic inspections, 
Time Compliance Technical Order installations, system calibrations, and Time Change 
Item (TCI) replacements.  TCIs are conducted on the critical parts replaced or repaired 
based on accumulated flight hours, not based on part condition.  The TCI area is another 
area where PHM and condition based maintenance may supercede the need for these 
maintenance actions.  The PHM can check system status and indicate when parts require 
maintenance, rather the traditional way of changing parts based on operating hours.  
The next steps prepare the aircraft for the next mission and may include weapon 
loading, software loading, fuel adjustment, etc.  Now the aircraft is ready for preflight 
inspections.  The crew chief conducts his inspection and then the aircrew performs their 
inspection.  The aircraft engine is started, and the last few items are completed, and the 
aircraft taxis to the end of the runway.  Certain aircraft require an end of runway 
inspection prior to aircraft launch.  Post-launch cleanup is then conducted; storing of fire 
extinguishers, inlet covers, etc., and conducting foreign object damage (FOD) inspections 
(Cardona and Sanford, 2001).  Figure 3 shows a notional timeline of a sortie indicating 
how an ALS can save time in the repair process. 
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Figure 3. Notional Timeline for an Aircraft with and without an ALS system  
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14 
order action notifies the appropriate aircraft maintenance specialist.  In theory, the right 
maintainer, the right part, and the right equipment meet the aircraft upon its return.  This 
significantly reduces the time to repair the jet and return it to operational status.  The 
autonomic logistic concept relies on two main objects to make the system function.  First, 
is the PHM system, the heart of the ALS.  PHM continuously monitors the aircraft for 
problems to include pending failures as well as after the fact failures.  The other 
important factor is the Distributed Information System (DIS), responsible for tracking 
and relaying the maintenance requirements to appropriate elements of the logistics chain. 
 
Autonomic Logistics 
  According to Smith et al (1999), the autonomic logistics concept grew out the 
JSF Concept Exploration phase with the Advanced Integrated Diagnostics Study.  “The 
study effort reviewed current aircraft systems and available technologies for promising 
techniques in prognostics, diagnostics, sensors, diagnostic design tools, maintenance 
systems and software systems (Smith, 1999:13).”  The goal is to move logistics from the 
current reactive mode to a proactive one.  During JSF Concept Development the concept 
architecture was developed from a program called Advanced Strike Integrated 
Diagnostics (ASID).  “Architecture features –such as the diagnostic design process, 
benefits of integrated information flow and feedback between operation, support and 
design function – were found to be important attributes (Smith, 1999:13).”     
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PHM  
 According to Becker et al (1998) machine prognostics is, “where failure modes 
and the remaining life of a system can be predicted (Becker, 1998:20).”  This is a simple 
way to think of prognostics.  A useful analogy is the way doctors make prognosis of 
human health.  Diagnostics tests such as X-rays and blood tests are conducted and 
analyzed by lab technicians and other specialists after which the doctor prescribes a 
treatment plan.  The same process applies to electrical and mechanical systems.  Sensors 
provide reasoners and electronic decision makers with current system status and 
operating conditions and these reasoners make a prognosis of system health.  If a problem 
is pending, a notification is sent to the flight line maintainer.  According to Becker et al, 
(1998), “The aim of prognostics is to stop disabling of fatal failures before they happen 
(Becker, 1998:20).” 
 According to Ferrell (2000) the requirements for a PHM are: 
a. Provide system health status to enable pilot alerts, reconfiguration, graceful 
degradation, and system capability assessment in the event of failure. 
 
b. Detect and isolate failures and report failure information to trigger the 
Autonomic Logistics process to effect maintenance. 
 
c. Collect and analyze component performance data to predict remaining life of 
selected components for the purpose of enhancing safety and better maintenance and 
spares planning. 
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DIS 
 The Distributed Information System (DIS) is more than just a stream of aircraft 
data; it takes the aircraft data and coverts it into information.  The following is a proposed 
list of that information:   
a. Maintenance Information/knowledge 
b. Supply chain management information 
c.  Health and usage information  
d. Forecast aircraft availability data 
e. Best use of resource recommendations 
f. Training Management (Henley: 2000) 
 
In addition to providing the above information, the DIS also tracks system, 
subsystem, and part trends and other issues.  This additional data is used to better manage 
the aircraft fleet.  If a particular part is showing signs of degradation and that aircraft is 
scheduled for other repairs, then the degraded part is replaced along with the scheduled 
maintenance. 
The Passive Aircraft Status System (PASS) is a component of the DIS that speeds 
the information transfer.  The PASS functions autonomously, first storing PHM data and 
then downlinking that information to the ground units of the logistics chain.  AFRL 
conducted a study of existing concepts and possible implementation of these for use on 
legacy aircraft.  AFRL was able to devise an architecture and build a desktop 
demonstration in JAVA®.  The demonstration showed possible timing of data transfer 
and the appearance of potential computer screens for the maintainer (Botello: 2000).     
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Other PHM Systems 
The Army and Navy are currently fielding the Health and Usage Monitoring 
Systems (HUMS) into their helicopter fleet.  This was an important factor for the 
condition based maintenance (CBM) policy that the Navy wants to implement (Schaefer 
and Haas: 2002; Deaton and Glenn: 1999).  CBM is not a new concept, a great deal of 
articles have been published for ground-based machinery.  Caterpillar seems to lead the 
field in this implementation with on-board diagnostics and remote information passage 
back to a central processing facility.  The Navy is moving towards this type of 
maintenance policy and away from the standard time-based policy.  The standard time- 
based policy specifies that items be repaired or replaced based on flight hours or some 
other usage time limit.  The CBM policy is to ascertain the condition of the critical part 
through sensor outputs and reasoner algorithms to repair or replace the parts only after a 
certain wear is detected.   
Schaefer and Haas investigated the impact of HUMS on the Navy’s logistics 
processes using a simulation model to examine HUMS impact on process reengineering, 
sensor failures, and false alarm rates (Schaefer and Haas:2002).  They focused on the 
operational level of helicopter logistics, specifically ten high maintenance subsystems.  
The processes with the model were based on a database of information which included, 
mean time to repair (MTTR), unscheduled and scheduled maintenance man-hours per 
flight hour, maintenance action, aircraft, and flight.  They provide some interesting 
conclusions.  First, they found that the baseline phase maintenance or scheduled 
maintenance represented a bottleneck, and second that false alarm rates have an adverse 
impact on availability (Schaefer and Haas:2002).  
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Another program the Navy is investigating is called the Thinline Health 
Monitoring System (THMS).  This was a demonstration applied to their Submarine 
Towed Array Systems (TAS).  The TAS is a critical submarine mission component that if 
it fails to operate, repairs are deferred until the submarine returns to port (Bishop and 
Matzelevich: 2001: 5).  The contractor, Areté Associates and Life Cycle Engineering 
(LCE) constructed this proof-of concept device to operate at the submarine level, similar 
to aircraft level for the Air Force.  The THMS device included data collection, storage, 
health assessment, and a prognostic capability.  This device utilized a Bayesian Belief 
Network as its prognostics engine.  The contractors showed that this proof-of-concept is 
feasible and that it has the potential to increase the TAS operational availability and 
provide a cost savings.     
 
Condition-Based Maintenance 
 There are numerous papers on condition-based maintenance (CBM).  This section 
discusses a few related to Department of Defense issues.  According to Nickerson and 
Nemarich (1990), CBM is motivated by the increasing complexity in Naval machinery 
and the decreases in the military budgets.  The Navy, like the Air Force, utilizes a time- 
based repair process rather than evaluating the condition of the machine to determine if 
maintenance is necessary.  CBM needs several items to operate.  First of all monitoring 
systems, algorithms to turn data into system state information, and forecasting abilities to 
predict future states (Nickerson and Nemarich: 1990).  According to Nickerson and 
Nemarich, Table 1 shows the potential benefits.  They caution that all tools of the system 
must be in place to receive the benefits. 
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Table 1. CBM Benefits (Nickerson and Nemarich: 1990) 
Reduce maintenance induced failures 50% 
Reduce maintenance actions 35% 
Increase Availability 20% 
Reduce inspection and repair hours 20% 
Reduce spare parts provisioning 20% 
Reduce good parts removal 10% 
Extend equipment life/overhaul cycle 10% 
 
 Several companies and universities have formed a consortium to examine ways to 
incorporate CBM.  This consortium is called Machinery Information Management Open 
Systems Alliance (MIMOSA).  The member organizations include Boeing, Caterpillar, 
MIMOSA, Newport News Shipbuilding, Oceana Sensor Technologies, Penn State ARL, 
Rockwell Automation and Rockwell Scientific.  According to Mitchell (2002) the 
alliance has the “initial objectives of providing a common, open protocol for exchanging 
complex condition information.”  The consortium is striving towards a JAVA® based 
eXtensible Markup Language (XML) viewer for the transfer of maintenance information 
over the Internet. 
 
Other Simulation Projects 
 Several simulation research projects have been conducted in the area of sortie 
generation.  It is appropriate to highlight those related to this research.  These simulation 
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projects come from academia, small disadvantaged businesses, larger companies and 
government.  Two previous AFIT theses directly relate our research effort.  These were 
the work of Capt Rene Rebulanan and Capt Mike Malley, both former Graduate 
Operations Research (GOR) students.   
Rebulanan (2000) developed an ALS simulation model simulating the sortie 
generation process both with and without the ALS.  The purpose of his research was to 
examine system performance and interaction of the ALS with the logistics chain 
(Rebulanan: 2000; 5).  Rebulanan’s model was written in the JAVA® program language 
using the SILK® software package and was called ALSim.  Rebulanan concentrated on 
specifying the impact of the ALS on the sortie generation process.  The main parts of the 
model included the Joint Distributed Information System (JDIS), PHM, and the logistics 
maintenance and supply chain (Rebulanan: 2000; 7).  The main measures of effectiveness 
of this model were aircraft availability, number of sorties generated and time waiting for 
supply.  The results showed that a statistically significant higher availability rate, and 
number of sorties generated could be obtainable with an ALS installed in the aircraft.  
However, the wait time was not significantly reduced when employing the ALS 
(Rebulanan: 2000: 56).   
This research parallels Rebulanan’s work establishing a more generic approach to 
ALS while expanding the functionality of the model components.  In addition, this effort 
incorporates more input data from the REMIS system and other emerging historical 
databases to provide a closer match to the real sortie generation system.    
Malley (2001) extended Rebulanan’s research adding more definition to the PHM 
system in the ALSim model (Malley: 2001: 27).  Since a true JSF PHM is still in 
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development and data was not available for modeling purposes, Malley generated 
notional sensor signals used by the PHM.  PHM performance was based on Artificial 
Neural Networks (ANN) trained to evaluate when a part was degrading past a pre-
established point of performance and then to predict this point based on assigned failure 
thresholds.  These failure thresholds could be modified to study the effects of the 
different levels.  The study focused on the probabilities of false alarm and detection and 
their associated times (Malley, 2001: 28).  Malley’s research provided a detailed 
approach to model the JSF PHM and some associated issues that may be encountered.    
Models of the sortie generation process have also been developed using 
Distributed Interactive Simulations.  These are large-scale simulations, which typically 
involve players from several different units at locations spread across the world.  They 
are usually run in real-time with no single simulation in control of the entire process 
(Miller: Class handouts, OPER671).  These simulations are becoming increasingly 
important due to the fact that flying hours and war games are so expensive.  These 
simulations are very detailed and complex, however they tend to leave out an important 
aspect of the simulation; the logistics of the operations.  According to Banks and Styz 
(1997), the simulations set sortie generation rates too high and logistics operations 
beyond capabilities.  Banks and Styz developed a tool called the Airbase Logistics 
System in AFIT’s Virtual Environments Laboratory as a means of “accurately portraying 
airbase logistics.”  Since it was too expensive to build a tool from scratch, their approach 
used existing tools that were integrated to interface with current Distributed Interactive 
Simulations systems.  
   
22 
 The government and its contractors have built other stand-alone simulation tools 
to model AF logistics such as SIMFORCE (2000), LogSam™ (2002), and LCOM 
(1990).  The largest of these tools is the LCOM model developed by the RAND 
Corporation for the Air Force.  LCOM has been in use since 1972 and has been validated 
against actual data including Desert Storm data.  SIMFORCE and LogSam™ are 
relatively new software tools that were developed by Kelley Logistics Support Services, 
and Synergy Corporation respectively.  SIMFORCE is written in Arena®.  Below is 
more detail on each model. 
 
LCOM 
The Logistics Composite Model (LCOM) was adopted as the Air Force Standard 
for modeling logistics manpower requirements.  LCOM is a large-scale computer 
simulation used to model manpower and other logistical requirements (XO website: 
2002).  It can handle large and small weapon systems and contains data preparation 
modules, a main simulation program, post processors, and models Air Force direct 
maintenance activities at the wing level.  LCOM is used to evaluate weapons system 
logistic resource impact due to weapons system modification and is used for what-if 
analyses during weapon system acquisition (XO web site; 2002).  The fundamental 
processes modeled are requirements for sortie demand, system reliability and 
maintainability, unscheduled and scheduled maintenance tasks, and ability to service 
demands (people, parts, equipment).  LCOM measures of effectiveness include:    
• Operations (e.g. sorties flown, missions cancelled); 
• Activities (e.g. average time to complete, resource wait time); 
• Personnel (e.g. man-hours utilized); 
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• Supply (e.g. number of spares backordered); 
• Shop repair (e.g. number of items repaired); 
• Equipment (e.g. equipment used); and 
• Aircraft (e.g. number of aircraft available) (XO web site; 2002) 
 
LCOM utilizes historical databases CAMS, and Reliability and Maintainability 
Information System (REMIS) along with the engineering data, Logistics Support 
Analysis (LSA), during it’s processing.  The model is written in SimScript II.5 and runs 
on an UNIX HP750 or personal computer.  Various verification and validation audits 
include a favorable comparison to Desert Storm data (XO web site: 2002).  “LCOM 
stochastically models the logistics (personnel, spare parts, test/repair equipment/facilities) 
required to support a weapon system operation under a given scenario” (XO web site: 
2002).  The process steps modeled are shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4. LCOM Sortie Generation Process 
 
 Figure 4 shows how the basic process flows, but not shown are some of the key 
details of the simulation.  Stochastic random variables are used to determine first if a part 
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is broken, then also if a replacement part is available for installation, and are the 
personnel and equipment available to repair the aircraft.   
The next section highlights a desktop simulation tool built by a small 
disadvantaged business.  This model simulated the sortie generation process but their 
approach was more focused on usability by the maintenance leadership.  These 
maintenance managers can use Scalable Integration Model for Objective Resource 
Capability Evaluations (SIMFORCE) at their desktop and do not require a long set-up 
time to get results.     
 
SIMFORCE 
 The Scalable Integration Model for Objective Resource Capability Evaluations 
(SIMFORCE) was built by Kelley Logistics Support Services and is written in the 
Arena® software language.  SIMFORCE simulates the wing level logistics activities to 
include the manpower, equipment, and facilities constraints.  It was built to allow 
decision makers to formulate what-if problems and analyze maintenance manpower 
utilization rates.  For example, a decision maker can determine how many crew chiefs 
would be required if a certain sortie generation rate was desired.  The inputs and outputs 
are devised and analyzed in Excel® (Brown and Powers: 2000).  Although LCOM and 
SIMFORCE simulate the same process their intended users differ.  LCOM provides the 
Air Force leadership with manpower estimates for new weapons systems or revised 
estimates for proposed changes.  SIMFORCE provides wing level maintenance mangers 
a decision support tool for conducting what-if problems, for example, “How is next 
week’s deployment going to affect their ability to conduct operations?”        
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LogSAM™ 
 The Logistics Simulation and Analysis Model (LogSAM™) is built by Synergy 
Inc.  LogSAM™ also simulates the aircraft sortie generation process.  The model is 
broken down into several modules, aircraft generation, sortie generation, preflight and 
launch, and post flight evaluation (Smiley: 1997).  Added features include its ability to 
schedule sorties based on the Air Tasking Orders (ATO).  These ATOs describe what 
targets to attack along with numbers and types of aircraft to use (DTIC web site: 2002).  
Synergy has also expanded LogSAM™ to include a module called LogBase™.  
LogBase™ simulates enemy attacks and the effect those attacks have on sortie generation 
capability (Synergy web site: 2002).  The other models discussed can simulate combat 
conditions (increase sortie activity) however, it seems that LogSAM™ has the unique 
feature of simulating attacks from the enemy. 
 The three models discussed above all have a certain unique purpose.  LCOM is a 
large government operated simulation tool that provides excellent manpower prediction.  
SIMFORCE is a desktop/web enabled tool allowing the maintenance manager to 
formulate and run what if scenarios.  LogSam™ is another desktop tool that not only 
conducts sortie generation simulations but allows war-time losses to be simulated.  They 
all simulate the sortie generation process, however, they simulate today’s flying 
conditions and not the future possibilities that will exist.  This research will attempt to 
investigate these evolving technologies and their impact on the aircraft sortie generation 
process.   
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Conclusion 
 The basic sortie generation process has remained constant over the past few years.  
An aircraft flies a sortie, lands, is parked and recovered, is serviced, the aircrew debriefs 
the maintenance personnel, the aircraft is checked for failures, if none exist, it is 
scheduled and then prepped for the next mission, taxis out and takes off for another 
sortie.  This cyclical process is repeated according to the daily flying schedule or until 
either a failure occurs or phase maintenance is required.  If a failure occurs the aircraft is 
sent to unscheduled maintenance and several other actions are conducted to repair the 
aircraft is the most expedite manner.   
As the literature search indicates several simulation tools have been developed to 
investigate the process, as it exists today.  However, several new concepts are emerging 
to make the process more efficient to save limited maintenance resources.  The ALS 
concept is one of these concepts that are being investigated.  The literature search 
indicates a gap in tools to simulate the sortie generation process along with the affect of 
ALS on this process.  This research builds a simulation tool to address ALS affects on the 
sortie generation process.    
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III.  Methodology 
 
Introduction 
 This chapter describes the Autonomic Logistics Systems sortie generation 
simulation model built for this research effort.  The following sections contain the key 
model assumptions, the model definition, and the results of the input analysis that was 
conducted on three data sets. The model was built to represent the aircraft sortie 
generation process defined in Figure 1 from Chapter 1.  A few differences from Figure 1 
exist due to the nature of not being able to model the real world exactly and certain 
instances where changes were necessary.   
 
Assumptions 
 Several assumptions were made during the model building process, these are 
broken down into model scope, key distinctions from the real process, and output 
differences from the real process. 
This model simulates the F-16 aircraft sortie generation operations but is scoped 
to only cover in detail the four LRUs that make-up the AN/APG-68 radar.  The other 
subsystems are modeled to experience failures at preflight inspection, where they fail per 
a percentage of scheduled sorties.  When these other systems fail, troubleshooting, 
testing, and documentation maintenance tasks are carried out that are discussed in later 
sections but no parts are removed or replaced nor supply ordered.  The entire supply 
system is not modeled either, the delivery of parts from the depot to the flight line are 
simulated via delays and transfer of simulated parts.  The manpower resources are built to 
simulate the various logistics specialties such as crewchiefs, various maintenance 
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specialists, refuelers, weapon specialists, etc. but their entire day is not fully modeled.  
For ease in modeling, these manpower resources are available 24 hours a day so that they 
can be seized by the aircraft wherever required.  This means that these resources have 
low utilization since they are not required for work while the aircraft is flying or when it 
is waiting for the next day’s scheduled takeoff.  The model was run with eight refuelers, 
eight weapons specialist, sixteen crewchiefs, sixteen maintenance specialists for 
debriefing, and sixteen phase inspection resources available to service the aircraft.  There 
were four maintenance specialists available to repair the aircraft.  These numbers are not 
typical base manning levels, but provide a reasonable pool of resources since the focus of 
this effort was to measure the ability to produce sorties and increase aircraft availability 
with the ALS system not to consider the impact of manpower usage.  Other sortie 
generation models discussed in Chapter 2 can perform these kinds of studies.     
The next few assumptions are where the model does not replicate the real process.  
First, the Can not Duplicate (CND) and Retest Okay (RTOK) events were not accounted 
for in the model.  These happen on the flight line or at the test bench when a reported 
failure cannot be repeated or the bench testing shows no faults to be repaired 
respectively.  However, the false alarms of the ALS PHM were modeled so that the 
analysis could include these actions.  A false alarm is where the PHM system indicates a 
failure but one really does not exist. These false alarms mimic CND and RTOKs since 
these are not true LRU failures.  Also as will be discussed later, the worst case impact is 
assumed for false alarms with part removal and replacement simulated for every 
occurrence.  If an aircraft is sent to unscheduled maintenance from a preflight failure, 
only troubleshooting, operational checkout, and documentation are conducted.  If an 
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aircraft is flagged for a LRU failure then a part is removed and replaced every time.  The 
diagnostics gives a 100% accuracy, which is not realistic in the real world, however, 
again the goal of this research was to compare ALS performance to current day 
operations.  Partial mission capable rates are not calculated since there is only the one 
system being simulated.  The aircraft only has three maintenance states, preflight failure, 
radar failure, or phase maintenance.   
The next assumptions note how the output differs from the real world.  Possessed 
aircraft hours equals the total simulation time.  This is true since no aircraft leave flying 
status (they do not get deployed or sent to the depot).  The Mission Capable rate is 
calculated by subtracting the Not Mission Capable rates for Supply and Maintenance.  
We are only explicitly modeling a single aircraft system (radar system) and how the 
failures of this system, with or without ALS, affect our selected MOEs.  Therefore, 
resource levels and other model parameters were selected to obtain a reasonable 
(approximately 80%) overall Mission Capable rate for our baseline model. 
The model does not specifically account for the time for not mission capable for 
both supply and maintenance.  The aircraft is either waiting on supply or it is being 
maintained (maintenance personnel always available with modeled resource levels).  The 
simulation is modeled to simulate 24 hours a day operations five days a week.  Typically 
each resource only works about 8 hours a day.  The weekends are not simulated even 
though they may be used in the real world to repair aircraft.  
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F-16 AN/APG-68 Radar 
 “The AN/APG-68 is an X-band, all weather, multimode Fire Control Radar 
(FCR) featuring extensive Air-to-Air (A/A) and Air-to-Ground (A/G) capabilities” 
(Castrigno, 2002; 20).  It consists of four LRUs; the antenna, the modular low power 
radio frequency, the dual mode transmitter, and the advanced programmable signal 
processor (Castrigno, 2002; 54).  These LRUs are abbreviated ANT, MLPRF, DMT, and 
APSP respectively in the model.  A portion of the data for this research was obtained 
from the Reliability and Maintainability Information System (REMIS) database 
maintained by Air Force Material Command.  It was complied over a two-year period 
examining F-16 failures at Hill AFB, UT.  The details of how this data was analyzed are 
found in the input analysis section.   
 
Input Data Analysis 
The input data was drawn from several sources.  The following explains how the 
data were transformed for use in the simulation model.  The first data set was used to 
determine the sortie duration.  This data came from the Data Transfer Cartridge (DTC) of 
the aircraft located at Hill AFB, UT.  The DTC data was from a three-month period 
during the summer of 2002.  Hill AFB takes care of transferring the data to a Microsoft 
Access database.  From there the data was transferred to Microsoft Excel® spreadsheets 
for transforming the time recording into raw data.  Next, the data was put through the 
Arena® Input Analyzer to determine an appropriate distribution for modeling the 
process.  Evaluating the mean square error of the curve fit between the empirical data and 
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the selected theoretical distributions, the normal distribution looked most reasonable.  
Also, after plotting the data, it seemed to closely match the normal distribution.   
Another data set from Hill AFB contained the sortie rates, MC, and TNMCM 
rates by tail number for the 388th Fighter Wing.  This data spanned the year 2001.  This 
data was used mostly to double-check the output of the simulation.   
The third data set was 18 months of REMIS data used to determine the LRU 
MBTF.  A better name may be mean time between LRU replacement, because the 
analysis did not include reviewing bench level and depot level testing to determine if this 
LRU was a CND or RTOK unit.  The analysis that was done included scaling the REMIS 
database down to just the tail numbers from Hill AFB and then further cutting the 
database back to only the tail numbers for the 4th Fighter Group.  This provided enough 
data for analysis to determine the mean time between replacement.  Lining up the 
operating times and looking at the difference of operating time between LRU 
replacement, and then averaging these numbers across the twenty tail numbers, the mean 
time between replacement was calculated.  Table 4 shows notional MBTF numbers.   The 
database did not include LRU failures for ASPS for that timeframe so twenty other tail 
numbers were selected from the larger database to calculate the mean time between 
replacement. 
 
Model Introduction 
The first items to be described are the different views of functional areas setup in 
the model.  Taking advantage of the named views in Arena®, several of these views were 
established for ease in navigation.  Table 2 shows these functional areas and provides the 
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associated hot key used to recall that view.  This will also be the template for the 
following paragraphs that describe the individual areas of the sortie generation model.  
The model is setup with Arena’s® stations and routings so that white space exists 
between the different areas that were simulated.  These station and routing modules move 
the aircraft entities between the appropriate areas.  This white space also was done to 
make the model easier to understand and made changes easier as the model evolved.  
Another benefit of the station and routing concept was that both the baseline sortie 
generation and ALS function exist in one model.  The setting of one variable on the 
graphical user interface defines whether the ALS is on or off.  
Table 2. Model Views 
View Hot Key 
Animation (a) 
Create (c) 
Mission Preparation (m) 
Preflight Inspection (p) 
Aircraft Launch (t) 
Flying (f) 
Landing (l) 
Parking and Recovery (r) 
Servicing and Debrief (s) 
Failure Checking (d) 
Preventative Maintenance (v) 
Hold (h) 
Unscheduled Maintenance (u) 
Supply (y) 
PHM (z) 
 
This model is a collection of process delays, decision modules, and routing 
stations setup to simulate the baseline sortie generation process or the ALS process 
depending on what output is desired by the user.  The majority of process delay times are 
from several subject matters experts interviewed during the course of the model building 
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and a RAND study on sortie generation (2002: 3).  Table 3 shows these processes, 
associated times, and cumulative time.    
Table 3. Model Process Times 
Area Mean Process 
Times (min) 
Cumulative 
Mean Times 
(min) 
Turn Around 
Times (min) 
Turn Around 
Cumulative Mean 
Times (min) 
Mission Preparation 
Refuel 
10 10 5 5 
 
Mission Preparation 
Re-arm 
30 40 15 20 
Preflight  60 100 10 30 
Engine start, Final 
system checks, Taxi, 
& Arm 
10 110 10 40 
Takeoff 3 113 3 43 
Fly  61 174 61 104 
Land and Taxi 15 189 15 119 
Park & Recovery 7 196 7 126 
Servicing 60 256 60 186 
Debrief 15 271 15 201 
 
Preventative and Unscheduled maintenance and supply times are not included in 
the table since not every aircraft goes through those processes every flight.  These times 
are described in their associated paragraphs below. 
 
Graphical User Interface 
The model is built with a graphical user interface (GUI) to allow the user to 
change any of the twenty-two different parameters prior to each replication.  A picture of 
the GUI is shown in Figure 5.  Table 4 includes the list of variables and attributes that can 
be changed and a brief description of each.  These values are the baseline starting points 
for each of the variables.  The false alarm and PHM Level 1 variables will be changed 
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from run to run to make comparisons from the existing sortie generation operations to 
one with an ALS.   
 
 
 
Figure 5.  Graphical User Interface 
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Table 4. GUI Variable Description 
Variable Description Initial 
Value 
Units 
attANTfail Time until failure of the ANT LRU  375 hours 
attAPSPfail Time until failure of the APSP LRU  425 hours 
attDMTfail Time until failure of the DMT LRU  550 hours 
attMLPRFfail Time until failure of the MLPRF LRU  275 hours 
varSupplyLevelANT Initial supply of ANT LRUs  7 N/A 
varSupplyLevelAPSP Initial supply of APSP LRUs  7 N/A 
varSupplyLevelDMT Initial supply of DMT LRUs  7 N/A 
varSupplyLevelMLPRF Initial supply of MLPRF LRUs  7 N/A 
varOrderLevelANT Order level for the ANT LRU  6 N/A 
varOrderLevelAPSP Order level for the APSP LRU 6 N/A 
varOrderLevelDMT Order level for the DMT LRU 6 N/A 
varOrderLevelMLPRF Order level for the MLPRF LRU 6 N/A 
varTakeoff1 Takeoff time for the 1st group of 4 A/C 0800 hours 
varTakeoff2 Takeoff time for the 2nd group of 4 A/C 1000 hours 
varTakeoff3 Takeoff time for the 3rd group of 4 A/C 1200 hours 
varTakeoff4 Takeoff time for the 4th group of 4 A/C 1400 hours 
varPreflightFail A/C that will fail the preflight inspection  5 percent
varFalseAlarm A/C that will experience a false alarm 3 percent
PHMLevel Level for aircraft to receive maintenance 10 hours 
PHMBit Determines if PHM if on or off  
(0 = off / 1 = on)  
1 N/A 
varSecondPHMLevel Level for aircraft to wait for maintenance 
and return to taxi or flying 
2 hours 
NumTurn Number of A/C to perform a turn around 
flight 
2 N/A 
 
 
Animation 
The animation area contains resource modules, queues, stations, and routing lines 
that are used to display the aircraft and supply entities and the paths that they move on 
throughout the simulation.  Also, plots are generated for the status of key output 
parameters.  Figures 6 and 7 show these areas. 
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Figure 6. Animation Area 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Dynamic Plots 
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Some of the set-up was modeled after Arena® examples and a paper from the 
literature search that showed how forming zones made the animation better (Raivio et al: 
2001).  The animation was also very helpful in program debugging.  Monitoring how the 
aircraft and supply entities progress through the system helped to make sure that they are 
moving according to their intended flow. 
 
Create 
The sixteen aircraft entities are created in the model at the start of each 
replication.  Figure 8 shows a view of this area.   
 
 
Figure 8. Aircraft Create Area 
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These aircraft entities enter into the sortie generation cycle shown in Figure 1.  
These entities are created once and never leave the simulation.  However, the entities are 
not running continuously in the model, they are held at the end of a simulated day, 
waiting for the next takeoff cycle to begin.  The takeoff times are set by the user at the 
beginning of the replication and remain constant through the replication.  The default 
times are 0800, 1000, 1200, and 1400.  The aircraft are released into the next day’s cycles 
four at a time.  If an aircraft goes into the prevent maintenance process or is held in 
unscheduled maintenance longer than a day, that aircraft would return to the hold area 
after completion of these tasks and then wait for the next scheduled takeoff time.  This 
process will be explained further in the Hold section.   
Before leaving this area, the aircraft are assigned an initial time until failure for 
the four simulated F-16 radar LRUs and time since last phase inspection.  The LRU 
failure time is a random draw from the exponential distribution with the mean set at the 
beginning of the replication.  These failure times are based on the input analysis of the 
REMIS data.  The user does have the option to change these numbers on the GUI screen.  
These times are setup like a countdown until failure time.  Once the simulation detects a 
failure, described in a later paragraph, then part of the simulated repair process is to make 
a new random draw from the exponential distribution with the same mean time from the 
beginning of the replication.   
The random draw for time since last phase inspection is set up similar to the draw 
for failure except in the model when an aircraft accumulates flying time, this time is 
added to the time since last phase inspection that was drawn.  This random draw from the 
uniform UNIF(0,300) distribution gives an aircraft an initial time since last phase 
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inspection so that all the aircraft are not entering phase maintenance at the same time.  
Also different from the failure time, once each aircraft has reached 300 hours the phase 
inspection is started.  Then once completed, their time since last phase inspection is reset 
to zero.  The aircraft entities leave the create area and are routed to the mission 
preparation area with the routing time set to zero. 
 
Mission Preparation 
The literature states that the real world sortie generation cycle starts with the 
landing of the aircraft.  However, it was more convenient to start the simulation with the 
mission preparation area.  As stated above, the flying schedule is a users choice, the 
default is starting mission preparation at 0800, 1000, 1200, and 1400.     
 
 
Figure 9. Mission Preparation Area  
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Figure 9 shows the modules and flow of the mission preparation area. Since there 
is no time change in the movement from the previously described create area or from the 
hold area described later, these are the times the mission preparation will start for the 
aircraft.  Each entering aircraft passes through a record module to record a sortie being 
scheduled, next it is assigned a starting time of TNOW, which is the current simulation 
time in Arena®.  This is the global time of the simulation and is used various places to 
facilitate calculation of failure times and process times for further output analysis.  A 
decision module determines if an aircraft system other than the radar has failed.  This 
check is a simple decision based on certain percentage of preflight failures that is set at 
the start of the simulation.  This check is done before the fueling and weapons loading 
process modules since an aircraft would checked for failure before refueling.  If an 
aircraft is selected to have a preflight failure it has an attribute called Status Bit that is set 
to zero so later decision modules know where the entity came from.  After the assign 
module the aircraft passes through a record module to note that a preflight failure has 
occurred and then it is routed to the preflight station of unscheduled maintenance.  The 
unscheduled maintenance will be described in a later paragraph.  If the aircraft passes the 
inspection then it enters the refueling and weapon loadings modules.  These are separate 
process modules that seize the resource refueler and weapon loader and delay the aircraft 
for a triangle distribution of TRI(8,10,12) and TRI(25, 30, 35) minutes  respectively.  The 
capacity of each resource is eight, simulated for the 24 hour day.  The model has the 
ability to move a certain number of aircraft back to mission preparation if they are being 
simulated to be an integrated combat turn.  This means an aircraft lands and parks and 
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immediately returns to the mission preparation area.  Similar steps are conducted with 
process modules for the turn around area except these times are adjusted.  These times are 
TRI(4, 5, 6) and TRI(10, 15, 20) for refueling and weapons loading.  These times are 
adjusted since it should not require the same length of time for a turn around mission.  
The total preparation time before the first scheduled takeoff, which includes mission 
preparation, preflight, taxi and takeoff, is about 2.5 hours.  Next the aircraft are routed to 
the preflight area. 
 
Preflight Inspection 
The simulated aircraft have been refueled and weapons loaded and are ready for 
the preflight inspection by the crewchief.  Figure 10 shows how this process is split into 
two based on if an aircraft is performing a turn around flight.   
 
 
Figure 10. Preflight Area 
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Once the aircraft have arrived to the preflight station they travel through a process 
module where they seize a crewchief and are delayed via a random draw from the 
triangle distribution TRI(50, 60, 70).  If being routed from the turn mission preparation 
area, they are only delayed TRI(5, 10, 15).  After they are finished with that process the 
clock is started on the LRUs.  This is done by setting the LRU failure start time attributes 
for each aircraft equal to TNOW.  Later in the simulation these attributes are compared to 
the current TNOW and that difference is used to compute the time that a LRU was 
operating.  This process decreases the time before failure for the LRU and eventually will 
trigger a failure.  The aircraft have completed refueling, weapon loading and preflight 
and they are now ready for taxi and takeoff.   
 
Aircraft Launch  
Since the aircraft have been prepped for flight, they are ready for engine start, 
final system check, and taxi.  Figure 11 shows the aircraft launch area.  
 
Figure 11. Aircraft Launch Area 
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The aircraft enters a process module where it seizes a taxiway and simulates 
engine start, final systems check, and taxiing to the runway. There are four taxiways 
resources available.  The aircraft are delayed according to the triangle distribution, TRI(7, 
10,12).  Next the LRU failure times are updated for each aircraft, this is for failure 
checking in this area.  Then the aircraft enter a decide area to determine if they are to be 
routed for PHM checking.  The PHM checking happens at four areas and it will be 
described in later sections.  If the PHM is off, then the aircraft entities are routed to the 
first failure checking area.  Three of these checking areas exist and the only difference 
between these areas is the counting for ground or air aborts and entity routing.  The 
failure checking compares all the LRU failures times against what level is set, usually 
zero.  If all failure levels are greater than zero then the entity is routed to the takeoff area.  
If a failure is detected then the entity is moved through an assign area that corresponds to 
the LRU that is indicating failure.  Its LRU failure time is redrawn from the exponential 
distribution with the same mean as before.  Also in this assign area, an attribute is 
attached that indicates which LRU failed.  This attribute will be used for routing later in 
the unscheduled maintenance area.  Next, a record module records the ground abort.  
Then the aircraft is routed to the unscheduled maintenance area.  If no failure exists, the 
aircraft is routed to a process module that simulates the takeoff.  The aircraft grabs the 
only runway, if available, and then is delayed by the triangle distribution, TRI(2, 3, 4).  
There is only one runway simulated so the other aircraft must wait for the aircraft to 
takeoff or land if it is already being used.  After the process delay the aircraft is routed to 
flying. 
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Flying 
The aircraft has now been prepped, has taxied and taken off.  Several checks and 
assignments are made in this area, these are shown in Figure 12.   
 
 
Figure 12. Flying Area 
 
After entering from the taxi and takeoff area, an assign area makes a random draw 
from the normal distribution with mean 2 hours and standard deviation of 0.5 hours.  
These are also notional numbers.  If the draw is less than 15 minutes then the sortie 
duration is set at 15 minutes.  The sortie duration was built from Hill AFB, UT input data 
described above.  Also, like the previous area, the failure time is decreased according to 
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how long they have been operating.  Once these assignments are complete then the 
aircraft goes through a decision module to determine if the PHM is turned on.  If PHM is 
being simulated the aircraft is routed to the PHM failure check area described later.  If the 
PHM is off, the aircraft is routed to check for an air abort.  Since the sortie duration is 
assigned a priori, a check can be made for an air abort.  The check is made to see if any 
of the LRU’s remaining life is less than the assigned sortie duration.  If less than sortie 
duration, then a new failure time is drawn, an air abort is counted, and the aircraft is 
routed to the unscheduled maintenance area.  If it passes this check, then it is routed to 
the false alarm check station.  The false alarm check is similar to the air abort and ground 
abort check except the percentage of false alarms are set by the user at the GUI and they 
are only used when the PHM is on.  A decision module is set-up so that equal chance 
exists for each LRU failure.  If a false alarm occurs it is counted and the aircraft is routed 
to unscheduled maintenance.  Otherwise, the aircraft is routed to the flying process 
module where a flying resource is seized and delayed for the sortie duration.  Sixteen 
resources are available for flying since it did not make sense in this model to restrict the 
number of pilots.  After the sortie process, the time since last phase inspection is 
increased by the sortie duration and the number of hours flown is increased by that same 
number.  Next, a sortie is recorded to be compared to the number of scheduled sorties for 
the flying efficiency calculation.  Then the aircraft are routed to the landing area. 
 
Landing   
Once the aircraft is routed to the landing area, it enters a process module where 
the runway is seized, if available, and delayed according to the triangle distribution, 
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TRI(14, 15, 16).  Figure 13 shows the station and routing and one process module for this 
area.   
 
Figure 13. Landing Area 
 
As noted above there exists only one runway resource, so a landing aircraft must 
wait if another entity has already seized the runway.  After landing processing, the 
aircraft is routed to the parking and recovery area. 
 
Parking and Recovery 
The parking and recovery area has two main functions happening concurrently, 
these are shown in Figure 14.   
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Figure 14. Parking and Recovery Area 
 
First the crewchief resource is seized and held while the aircraft is moved through 
this entire mode.  Next, the aircraft is checked to see if it already has been chosen for a 
turn around that day.  If so, it is sent along a path that will eventually take it to the hold 
area.  If not, the aircraft proceeds to another decision module to see if it will be turned 
around for another consecutive flight.  This decision module makes it determination on 
how many to turn around based on the preset number by the user.  This is modeled this 
way to insure the same aircraft is not repeatedly turned around.  This sets up two identical 
paths that the aircraft can take and they have similar modules so only one will be defined 
here.  The aircraft enters an assign module to have the parking and recovery time 
determined.  This time is a random draw from the triangle distribution TRI(5, 7, 9).  Two 
minutes is subtracted from this time but will be accounted for in the next module.  This is 
done to allow two minutes for aircraft parking and then the clock is stopped on the LRUs, 
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simulating engine shutdown.  The remainder of the parking and recovery time is 
processed, the crewchief is released and then the aircraft proceeds to service and debrief 
or mission preparation if the aircraft is being turned around for another flight. 
 
Service and Debrief 
 Once the aircraft has entered the service and debrief area it is assigned service and 
debrief times via an assign module.  These times are from the triangle distribution, 
TRI(45, 60, 75) for service and TRI(10,15,20) for debrief.  These nodes are set-up to run 
concurrently, whichever time is greater is processed first and then the remainder of the 
time is processed in the second delay.  Figure 15 shows the split for the larger process 
time.   
 
Figure 15. Service and Debrief Area 
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The current process times do not require the next decision area since the 
maximum debrief time is less than the minimum service time, but the logic is included in 
case there was a change to the times.  This decision area sends the aircraft to the path that 
has the largest process time.  Depending on which time is larger either the crewchief or 
maintenance debriefer is seized first.  Once the process is complete for either the service 
or debrief, that resource is released and the other resource is seized.  After the second 
process is complete the second resource is released and then the aircraft is routed to the 
failure check station.    
 
Failure Checking  
In this area the aircraft is checked for any LRU failures, or like the other checks 
any LRU failure times less than the preset level.  Figure 16 shows a view of this area.   
 
 
Figure 16. Failure Checking Area 
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After the aircraft enters the area, an assign module assigns the Status Bit to three 
and then the aircraft is routed through a decision area to see if PHM is on.  If this is a 
PHM run, then the aircraft is routed to the PHM area and does not return.  If PHM is not 
on, the aircraft is routed to the decision module to see if any LRUs are below the preset 
failure level, again usually zero.  If no failure is present then the aircraft is routed to be 
checked for phase maintenance being required.  If a failure exists the failure time is 
redrawn from the exponential distribution and the aircraft is routed to unscheduled 
maintenance. 
 
Preventative Maintenance 
 After debrief or unscheduled maintenance the aircraft are routed to preventative 
maintenance.  Figure 17 shows a view of this area.   
 
 
Figure 17. Preventative Maintenance Area 
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The first thing that happens is a check to see if enough flight time has 
accumulated to require phase maintenance.  This phase is done based on a set number of 
flight hours, for the F-16 that equals 300 hours.  In the Flying area the individual aircraft 
accumulate flying hours based on sortie duration.  The starting point is determined by a 
random draw from the uniform distribution UNIF(0,300).  This gives every aircraft a 
different time that it will enter phase and then return to phase.  This is helpful since phase 
maintenance is scheduled to last from 5 to 8 days based on a random draw from a triangle 
distribution.  The aircraft are then reset to zero phase time so again different spacing is 
maintained.  After the check to see if enough time has accumulated, the aircraft are either 
routed to the hold area or to the phase maintenance area.  In the phase maintenance area, 
the aircraft attributes are changed to reflect phase having been conducted, a record area 
updates the number of aircraft that have been through phase, eight maintenance specialist 
are seized and delayed with the aircraft for the time specified above, and then once 
released the time in phase is recorded.  The aircraft are routed to the hold area where they 
will reenter the model based on the predetermined start times.  Under the PHM scenario 
similar activities take place but the opportunity for unscheduled maintenance is available.  
If the aircraft enters the PHM checking area with an LRU almost ready to fail and phase 
maintenance within the PHM Level of hours until phase maintenance, then the aircraft is 
routed to the Prevent PHM Mx Station.  At this series of modules, the aircraft seizes the 
maintenance specialists and starts phase maintenance but then simultaneously the aircraft 
is routed to unscheduled maintenance to repair the LRU.  After returning from 
unscheduled maintenance, the aircraft phase maintenance is completed and then the 
aircraft returns to the hold area.  The reason this was modeled this way was another 
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opportunity to save maintenance time while phase is being conducted.  The real world 
will be monitoring for these conditions to exist so even though the PHM does not exist 
the thought was that this may be a feature that it would utilize. 
 
Hold 
 The aircraft enter the hold station and are first delayed by the difference from the 
first takeoff time to the last plus one hour and then are routed to another hold module 
until triggered by another entity.  Figure 18 shows these two holds and the modules that 
trigger the collection of some of the output statistics.    
 
 
Figure 18. Hold Area 
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These new entities are created per the predefined starting schedule.  The entities 
are created, then trigger a signal to the hold module which will release up to four aircraft 
entities.  There are an infinite number of trigger entities created.  If any aircraft are in 
preventative maintenance or unscheduled maintenance then less than four are released.  
Two other entities that are created in this area, signal the collection of the daily aircraft 
availability and number of sorties. 
 
Unscheduled Maintenance 
 This is one of the most complicated and most important areas since it determines 
the maintenance time and supply times used in post processing analysis.   
 
 
Figure 19. Unscheduled Maintenance Area 
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Figure 19 shows the view of the unscheduled maintenance area.  Aircraft entities 
enter this area from various places in the model if an LRU is less than the preset failure 
level or in the PHM case below the PHM preset level.  They can also enter this area from 
the preflight failure area of the mission preparation area.  Entities entering from the 
preflight failure first are routed to an assign module that sets an attribute equal to one for 
separation from the radar failures at two points of this area.  Also, the other starting time 
attribute is set to TNOW, and lastly a variable that counts the number of preflight failures 
is updated.  This is a duplicate counting from the mission preparation area but a good 
double check.  As stated in the assumptions, preflight failures simulate a failure of a 
system other than radar but no parts are replaced.  Next the entity enters a decision area to 
determine if PHM is on.  If PHM is on, troubleshooting is bypassed since the PHM will 
have already conducted this troubleshooting.  If not on, the entity starts the 
troubleshooting process by seizing a maintenance specialist and is delayed by the triangle 
distribution, TRI(20, 24, 30).  After troubleshooting the aircraft enters another decision 
area for determining which LRU to order from supply.  Since this is a preflight failure, no 
order is required and the aircraft is sent to another decision module to determine if PHM 
is on.  If not the aircraft enters a series of delays that seize the maintenance specialist at 
each processing module.  These are operational check TRI(15, 20, 25), signoff 
discrepancy TRI(5, 10, 15), and document corrective action TRI(5, 10, 15).  If PHM is 
on, these delays are again bypassed expect for document corrective action since the ALS 
system will be able to complete these items independently and present documentation to 
the maintenance specialist via a handheld computer device for a quick verification and 
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sign off.  Next, the aircraft entity is split from the radar failure entities and another set of 
assign modules record the time the entity has spent in the system and it resets status bits.  
Lastly, the aircraft enters the last decision module to determine if this aircraft came from 
PHM preventative maintenance, explained in the previous paragraph.    
 If a LRU failure occurs the aircraft entity enters from a different station and is 
assigned key attributes.  These attributes are the same as before but are key to counting 
radar failures and the amount of hours that an aircraft spends in maintenance.  The 
aircraft enters the decision module to see if PHM is on.  If not troubleshooting is 
conducted with the same time as above.  Next, the aircraft enters the decision module to 
see which LRU needs to removed, replaced, and ordered.  When the aircraft traveled 
through the failed LRU assign module to reset the failure time, that assign module also 
assigned an attribute bit to one.  So the aircraft is routed to the appropriate LRU area.  All 
these LRU areas are the same so only one will be described.  The aircraft first enters a 
process module that seizes a maintenance specialist.  The aircraft is delayed by the 
triangle distribution, TRI(45, 60, 70), and then the aircraft enters an assign module that 
reduces the supply variable by one and the supply time is assigned TNOW.  The aircraft 
then enters a decision module that determines if a part needs to be ordered.  This level is 
set at the GUI screen, the default is to order a part as soon as one is used.  If a part is to be 
ordered another decision module is entered to determine if parts are available.  If 
available, the aircraft enters a signal module to signal that a supply entity needs to be 
released from its hold module.  If parts are not available, then the part enters a similar 
signal module, then stops at the hold area waiting for the supply entity to release it.  After 
the supply entity releases the aircraft is enters a decision to see if PHM is on.  If it is on, 
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then the entity bypasses the time to waiting for the part to be delivered from supply since 
the part would have already been ordered by the ALS.  If PHM is off, the aircraft enters a 
delay module TRI(0.5, 2, 2.5) hours waiting for the part to issued from supply and it then 
enters a process module to be delayed for the paperwork to be completed, TRI(5, 10, 15).  
The aircraft then enters an assign module to calculate the time waiting for supply and 
then enters a process module to replace the LRU.  In this module a maintenance specialist 
is seized and the aircraft is delayed TRI(60, 84, 120).  After, that the aircraft enters the 
same path as described above for a preflight failure at the operational check area.  Also, 
like described above these entities are split from the preflight entities and times in 
maintenance are updated.     
 
Supply 
If flagged for repair, the aircraft entity is moved to the unscheduled maintenance area 
where it will eventually reach the supply ordering area.  The aircraft are separated based 
on which LRU flagged the repair and sent to the respective repair and ordering cycle.   
There exists four identical repair and ordering cycles in the model.  Figure 20 shows one 
of these ordering areas.   
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Figure 20. Ordering of Supplies in Unscheduled Maintenance 
 
As discussed above, first the aircraft experiences a simulated removal, and then 
the attributes and variables are adjusted.  Next a decide area determines if a replacement 
spare needs to be ordered.  The subject matter experts suggested once a part is used 
another is ordered.  However, the user can set a different level at the beginning of the 
replication if so desired.  If a part is to be ordered another decision area is set up to make 
sure enough parts are available.  The aircraft is held in a Hold area until a part arrives or 
if a part is available then the aircraft triggers another entity to start the part ordering 
process. This other entity represents a supply truck being sent from the depot or 
manufacturer to the base.  Figure 21 shows the routing of these entities.  Note in this area 
that the calculated process times are modeled as delays in the routing from station to 
station.   
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Figure 21. Supply Area 
 
Eight entities are held waiting for a signal that a part is required.  If the aircraft 
initiates the signal then only one truck leaves the depot and proceeds to the base.  This 
model is not intended to fully represent the depot to base process, just simple delays are 
set-up to allow for simulation of supply.  The delay for travel to the base is a triangle 
distribution of TRI(0.1, 0.3, 0.5) days.  Once the simulated part arrives on base the 
attributes and variables are updated and then a signal is sent to release one aircraft from 
the parts not available hold.  The delay for the return to depot is from the uniform 
distribution, UNIF(0.25, 0.5) days.  The supply entity returns to the hold area awaiting 
another signal that a part is needed.  After being released the aircraft goes through a 
decision area to determine if the PHM is being simulated.  If no, then the aircraft must 
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wait for the part to moved from base supply to the flight and issued.  This is done since 
the DIS will have already notified supply that a part is required and will have it waiting 
when the aircraft returns from the mission. 
 
PHM 
 The PHM area conducts checks the same as the other ground check and air abort 
and failure checking areas.  However, at these modules the variable used to check for 
failure is greater than zero.  In other words, the model consider a part “failed” if its 
remaining life is less than some amount of time.  Figure 22 shows the decision, 
assignment and record modules that make up this area. 
 
 
Figure 22. PHM Area 
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  The default setting is 10 hours but, the user may change that setting.  This area is 
designed to return an aircraft back to the ground or air abort stations if they are not below 
2 hours time remaining.  This variable is also adjustable at the GUI screen.  This is 
modeled this way so that a ground or air abort does not occur and this may be the way 
that the real PHM is modeled.  As stated in the literature search, the PHM will be 
equipped with sensors and reasoners to try and determine the best time for maintenance.  
If maintenance can be delayed because LRU life remains and it would not be a safety 
hazard, then operations may continue to a more convenient time.  
 
 
Model Verification and Validation  
The verification and validation and was done in two steps.  The verification was 
done by the model builder.  Each area was scrubbed for correct modeling, the animation 
was observed on several occasions to check proper aircraft flow, and the output was 
compared against real world data to check accuracy of the simulated output.  The 
validation was conducted with six subject matter experts (SME) from AFRL Human 
Effectiveness Directorate, Logistics Readiness Branch (2002).  The different model areas 
were reviewed by the SMEs and each process was evaluated for accuracy.  The suggested 
changes included times for turning on the clock for the LRUs, changes to process times 
like preflight, service, phase, fueling, and weapon loading, and the number of sorties and 
length of sorties were discussed.  These suggestions were incorporated into the model 
that was previous described.     
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A final verification analysis was conducted by running 10 replications for one 
simulated year equal to 250 hours 50 weeks times 5 days per week.  The output was 
scrubbed for reasonableness and compared to the Hill sortie data.  The outputs that were 
analyzed were Sorties/day, MC rates, number of spares ordered/number of items repaired, 
spares levels, and flying effectiveness.  The results of the final verification are located in 
Appendix A. 
 
Conclusion 
 The model for this research was built to replicate the sortie generation process and 
the future ALS in order to measure its effect on this important process.  This chapter 
detailed the processes that make up the model.  Sixteen aircraft enter into the simulated 
day in groups of four, at four distinct times.  The aircraft are subject to numerous 
processes that first prepare them for flight, simulate taxi, takeoff, flying, and landing, and 
then they are serviced and debriefed all in the means of returning the aircraft to flying 
status.  Returning the aircraft to flying status may involve repair and replacement of a 
certain radar LRU or as simple as troubleshooting and documentation.  The ALS 
simulates the aircraft being monitored continuously for anticipated faults and repairs are 
made according to a predetermined level before the fault occurs.  The main focus of the 
ALS has been on the PHM and assumptions were made that DIS would be fully 
functional.  The PHM did include false alarms that were significantly detrimental to the 
sortie generation process since with every false alarm a LRU is removed and replaced, 
believing that the PHM is always correct and has fault isolated to the correct part.  Lastly, 
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the final verification runs were extremely helpful in learning a great more about the 
model with the review of output that will be similar to the analysis output.        
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IV. Analysis and Results 
 
Introduction 
The previous chapter defined the simulation model that was used for this research.  
This chapter defines the steps in setting up and performing our analysis.  These steps 
include determining the appropriate length and number of replications to produce 
sufficiently normal output data while meeting a specified confidence interval half width.  
This discussion then sets up the analysis of the results from the simulation runs.   
 
Simulation Output Variables 
 PACAFI 21-102 lists the logistics performance terms that a unit must report to 
higher headquarters.  The output of this simulation model was structured after this 
instruction.   
Table 5. Logistics Performance Measures 
Identifier Average Half-width Minimum Maximum 
Possessed Hrs 30000 0 30000 30000
AVG Possessed ACFT 16 0 16 16
MC Hours 24101 62.176 23750 24446
MC Rate 0.80337 0.00207 0.79167 0.8149
NMCM Hours 4151.1 40.092 3950.4 4346.2
NMCM Rate 0.13837 0.00134 0.13168 0.14487
NMCS Hours 1747.6 24.893 1590.9 1903.7
NMCS Rate 0.05826 8.30E-04 0.05303 0.06346
Sorties Scheduled 21778 18.534 21666 21881
Sorties Flown 20110 25.728 19968 20237
Hourly UTE Rate 1280.3 1.6213 1272.2 1289.9
Sortie UTE Rate 1256.8 1.608 1248 1264.8
Hours Flown 20486 25.941 20356 20639
Flying Sch Eff Rate 0.9234 7.88E-04 0.91706 0.92728
Air Aborts 586.4 9.2633 554 641
Ground Aborts 111.3 3.6937 94 130
Abort Rate 0.03572 5.11E-04 0.03339 0.03844
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Table 5 lists these output variables and shows their magnitudes and associated 
confidence interval half widths for our baseline scenario with thirty replications.  The 
PACAFI includes more performance parameters but it felt was that those shown in Table 
5 represent variables that were important to this research.  In the next paragraph these 
variables were scoped down to key measures of effectiveness (MOE) that would 
represent an analysis of an aircraft equipped with an ALS.  
 
Key Measures of Effectiveness 
Preliminary runs of the simulation model plus the baseline runs discussed in the 
previous chapter helped to make key decisions on the MOEs that were analyzed.  These 
MOEs are Mission Capable Rate, Not-mission Capable for Maintenance and Supply, and 
Flying Scheduling Effectiveness.  The Mission Capable and Not-Mission Capable rates 
are based on the number of hours that an aircraft spent in each of these status categories.  
The Not Mission Capable hours for Maintenance included both the preflight failures and 
the radar failures, while the Not Mission capable rate for supply tallied the time an 
aircraft waited for a specific LRU.  The Flying Scheduling Effectiveness rate is based on 
the number of flown sorties divided by the total number of scheduled sorties.  It was felt 
that these rates would offer the best way to observe the differences between the baseline 
system and the ALS, and also the differences between the different ALS levels that were 
set-up.          
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Results 
 The goal for the half width variation for the key MOEs was plus or minus 2%.  
The majority of the baseline runs were conducted at 250 days, which is equivalent to 50 
weeks of work at five days a week with two weeks dropped for holidays.  This run length 
combined with 10 replications provided a confidence interval half width of less than one 
percent, which is well under the goal that had been set.  However, at just 250 days not 
every aircraft was experiencing the phase inspection downtime.  Extending the run length 
to 5 years or 1250 days allowed every aircraft to go through that inspection at least once.  
This replication length combined with 10 replications provided confidence interval half 
widths on the order of 0.2 percent, well below the goal of plus or minus 2% half width. 
The next step was to determine the number of replications that produced data that 
exhibited normal behavior.  Utilizing the software tool JMP®, the Mission Capable Rate 
and Flying Effectiveness outputs distributions were plotted.  Two aspects of this 
distribution were examined, first they were fit to a normal distribution and second the 
shape of the distribution was observed from the graph.  The data from the 10 replication 
runs passed the Shapiro-Wilk goodness of fit (GOF) test at the alpha level of 0.05.  
However, the plot of the distribution did not appear to have the normal bell shaped curve, 
so the number of replications was increased to 20.  Figure 23 shows the Mission Capable 
Rate distribution for 20 replications.  Figure 24 show the Flying Effectiveness for 20 
replications. 
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Figure 23. Mission Capable Rate Distribution for 20 Replications   
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Figure 24. Flying Scheduling Effectiveness Rate Distribution of 20 Replications   
 
With 20 replications the output again passed the Shapiro-Wilk GOF test at the 
0.05 level but the distribution still did not appear normal, so the replications were 
increased to 30.  This output again passed the Shapiro-Wilk GOF test and the graphed 
distribution appeared to have the normal bell shape.  Therefore it was decided to use this 
combination of 30 replications and 5 years length.  It also should be noted here that the 
execution time for each replication at 5 years was quite small (two minutes), therefore the 
increased run time in going from 10 to 30 replications was minimal.  Figure 25 shows the 
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distribution for Mission Capable Rate at 30 replications.  Figure 26 shows the distribution 
for Flying Effectiveness at 30 replications. 
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Figure 25. Mission Capable Rate Distribution of 30 Replications   
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Figure 26. Flying Scheduling Effectiveness Rate Distribution of 30 Replications   
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Once the number of replications and replication length were determined, the 
critical factors and levels of those factors were determined.  Examining the twenty-two 
(PHM on or off was not considered) possible input variables to change, it was determined 
that the PHM Level and False Alarm Percentage were the two factors that were most 
important to examine.  The reasoning that leads to this decision can be broken down by 
the groups of variables.  First the MTBF numbers were fixed because examination of 
improved reliability was not the goal of this research.  The supply numbers were fixed 
since again supply was not an area of interest to investigate.  Like the others, takeoff 
times were not of a major concern.  Fixing the preflight failure level and the mean time 
until phase, and number of aircraft to turn helped to focus the scope to the key factors.  
Lastly, the baseline runs showed that the second PHM level variable had little effect on 
the MOEs, so it was fixed.  That left the two factors that were the main concentration of 
the research and the runs were set up to produce output that would efficiently and 
effectively examine the space of the false alarm and PHM level factors.  Therefore, a 32 
full factorial design of experiments was used.   
The number of false alarms are based on the number of sorties simulated.  As 
discussed in Chapter 3, the aircraft moves through a decision module in the flying area 
and a false alarm occurs based on a predetermined percentage.  This simulates an air 
abort and a LRU being removed and replaced.  This is a worse case scenario since no 
further troubleshooting is completed to verify if this was a fault or a false alarm.  This 
was purposely simulated this way to examine the worse case.  Also, it was determined 
that the lowest setting for false alarm percentage would be one, meaning that false alarms 
were always on.  This factor seems like it would have the greatest impact on the 
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simulated sortie generation process since several actions are started once a false alarm is 
detected.  The PHM level factor is based on a time prior to the failure of the LRU.  The 
times can be translated as knowing when a failure was about to occur with a degree of 
certainty.  A low setting meant better certainty of an impending failure while higher 
meant not as sure.          
The baseline runs showed a significant drop off of key output measures of 
effectiveness with false alarm rates over 5%.  Therefore the false alarm rate was limited 
to 5%.  It was also felt that with an operating ALS there would always be false alarms, so 
the minimum percentage was set to one and the center point at three.  The baseline runs 
additionally provided insight into selecting PHM levels.  The Mission Capable rates 
dropped slightly with increasing PHM level.  This makes sense since overall LRU life is 
limited, and increasing the time before actual failure when an LRU is removed from the 
aircraft would decrease the overall life and in turn the overall Mission Capable rate.  
However, this will be a trade-off that the ALS designers will need to study since in-flight 
and unscheduled maintenance hurts flight operations, but removal and replacement too 
early is more costly.  The approach that was taken for this research was that setting the 
PHM level at 5 hours to represent the system was predicting failure to an accurate level, 
while a high of 15 hours meant that the PHM was not as accurate in predicting failure.  
This left the center point of 10 hours.  Also, the minimum of 5 hours provided for no 
ground or air aborts    Table 6 shows the two factors and the levels that were simulated. 
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Table 6. Simulation Factor Levels 
 Low Center High 
False Alarm (%) 1 3 5 
PHM Level (hours) 5 10 15 
 
Output Analysis 
With the design of experiments presented, simulation runs were conducted and 
then output was analyzed.  First the means of the MOEs for the nine ALS runs were 
graphed for each key MOE as shown in Figures 27, 29, 31, and 33.  These graphs all 
indicate that the various MOEs do not change significantly across different PHM levels, 
but do vary with false alarm level.  There is more discussion on this topic in the Analysis 
of Variance section later.  Figures 28, 30, 32, and 34 shows the PHM level (5 hours) that 
produces the best MOE for each false alarm level with the mean for our baseline system 
without an ALS.  For the Mission Capable rate, the false alarm level of 5% does not show 
any improvement over the non ALS system.        
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Figure 27. Mission Capable Rate ALS Runs 
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Figure 28. Mission Capable Rate Baseline and ALS Runs 
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Figure 29. Not Mission Capable Rate for Maintenance ALS Runs 
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Figure 30. Not Mission Capable Rate for Maintenance Baseline and ALS Runs 
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Figure 31. Not Mission Capable Rate for Supply ALS Runs 
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Figure 32. Not Mission Capable Rate for Supply Baseline and ALS Runs 
 
Flying Sch Eff Rate
0.88
0.89
0.9
0.91
0.92
0.93
0.94
0.95
FA 1
PHM 5
FA 1
PHM
10
FA 1
PHM
15
FA 3
PHM 5
FA 3
PHM
10
FA 3
PHM
15
FA 5
PHM 5
FA 5
PHM
10
FA 5
PHM
15
 
Figure 33. Flying Scheduling Effectiveness ALS Runs 
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Figure 34. Flying Scheduling Effectiveness Baseline and ALS Runs 
 
The decrease in Mission Capable Rate is driven more by the increase in Not 
Mission Capable for Maintenance.  Comparing the scales of the two Not Mission Capable 
graphs, the Maintenance level is twice that of supply.  Also, the ALS with 3% false alarm 
percentage for Not Mission Capable for Maintenance exceeds the baseline level.   
 
Analysis of Variance 
To compare the different ALS levels that were simulated an Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) (Wackerly et al; 2002) was used.  This analysis would compare the different 
effects of the two variables that are shown in Table 6.  Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10 show the 
ANOVA of each MOE.     
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Table 7. ANOVA of Mission Capable Rate 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.98216 
RSquare Adj 0.981959 
Root Mean Square Error 0.005068 
Mean of Response 0.830592 
Observations 270 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio 
Model 3 0.37618206 0.125394 4881.459 
Error 266 0.00683296 0.000026 Prob > F 
C. Total 269 0.38301502  <.0001 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Max RSq 
Lack Of Fit 5 0.00009227 0.000018 0.7145 0.9824 
Pure Error 261 0.00674069 0.000026 Prob > F  
Total Error 266 0.00683296  0.6130  
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error T Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept 0.8305923 0.000308 2692.8 0.0000 
FA*PHM -0.001288 0.000463 -2.78 0.0058 
FA -0.045388 0.000378 -120.1 <.0001 
PHM -0.005363 0.000378 -14.20 <.0001 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F 
FA*PHM 1 1 0.00019897 7.7457 0.0058 
FA 1 1 0.37080544 14435.07 <.0001 
PHM 1 1 0.00517765 201.5607 <.0001 
 
Table 8. ANOVA of Flying Scheduling Effectiveness 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.987949 
RSquare Adj 0.987813 
Root Mean Square Error 0.001761 
Mean of Response 0.925279 
Observations 270 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio 
Model 3 0.06765676 0.022552 7269.155 
Error 266 0.00082525 0.000003 Prob > F 
C. Total 269 0.06848202  <.0001 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Ma RSq 
Lack Of Fit 5 0.00000897 0.0000018 0.5736 0.9881 
Pure Error 261 0.00081628 0.0000031 Prob > F  
Total Error 266 0.00082525  0.7202  
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept 0.9252793 0.000107 8631.8 0.0000 
FA*PHM 0.0000592 0.000161 0.37 0.7132 
FA -0.019387 0.000131 -147.7 <.0001 
PHM 0.0001131 0.000131 0.86 0.3897 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F 
FA*PHM 1 1 0.00000042 0.1354 0.7132 
FA 1 1 0.06765404 21806.59 <.0001 
PHM 1 1 0.00000230 0.7423 0.3897 
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Table 9. ANOVA of Not Mission Capable Rate for Supply 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.940318 
RSquare Adj 0.939644 
Root Mean Square Error 0.001983 
Mean of Response 0.024024 
Observations 270 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio 
Model 3 0.01647906 0.005493 1396.975 
Error 266 0.00104593 0.000004 Prob > F 
C. Total 269 0.01752500  <.0001 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Max RSq 
Lack Of Fit 5 0.00006711 0.000013 3.5792 0.9441 
Pure Error 261 0.00097882 0.000004 Prob > F  
Total Error 266 0.00104593  0.0038  
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept 0.0240238 0.000121 199.07 <.0001 
FA 0.0095058 0.000148 64.32 <.0001 
PHM 0.0010852 0.000148 7.34 <.0001 
FA*PHM 0.0001336 0.000181 0.74 0.4612 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F 
FA 1 1 0.01626496 4136.473 <.0001 
PHM 1 1 0.00021197 53.9067 <.0001 
FA*PHM 1 1 0.00000214 0.5446 0.4612 
 
Table 10. ANOVA of Not Mission Capable Rate for Maintenance 
Summary of Fit 
RSquare 0.984275 
RSquare Adj 0.984098 
Root Mean Square Error 0.003759 
Mean of Response 0.145384 
Observations 270 
Analysis of Variance 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio 
Model 3 0.23520471 0.078402 5550.03 
Error 266 0.00375760 0.000014 Prob > F 
C. Total 269 0.23896231  <.0001 
Lack Of Fit 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F Ratio Max RSq 
Lack Of Fit 5 0.00004983 0.000010 0.7015 0.9845 
Pure Error 261 0.00370777 0.000014 Prob > F  
Total Error 266 0.00375760  0.6227  
Parameter Estimates 
Term Estimate Std Error t Ratio Prob>|t| 
Intercept 0.1453838 0.000229 635.60 0.0000 
FA 0.0358817 0.00028 128.08 <.0001 
PHM 0.0042786 0.00028 15.27 <.0001 
FA*PHM 0.0011543 0.000343 3.36 0.0009 
Effect Tests 
Source Nparm DF Sum of Squares F Ratio Prob > F 
FA 1 1 0.23174964 16405.51 <.0001 
PHM 1 1 0.00329517 233.2645 <.0001 
FA*PHM 1 1 0.00015990 11.3192 0.0009 
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The Mission Capable Rate ANOVA shows that there exists statistical significant 
difference between the different effects simulated and that all factors including the 
interaction factor were significant at the alpha level of 0.05.  The interaction factor 
indicates that a linear model is not appropriate for the model response surface, but the 
lack of fit p-value exceeding an alpha of 0.05 indicates that second order factors are not 
needed to describe the model.  The Flying Scheduling Effectiveness Rate ANOVA is also 
significant.  However, it differs from the Mission Capable rate ANOVA since only the 
false alarm factor was significant at the alpha level of 0.05.  This was an interesting 
discovery about the PHM level indicating that changes over that factor’s range would not 
affect the ability to produce sorties, if that was the most significant factor for a flying 
wing.  The ANOVA for Not Mission Capable Rate for Supply showed that the effects 
were significant and that the two factors were significant but the interaction was not.  
Like the overall Mission Capable Rate ANOVA, the Not Mission Capable Rate for 
Maintenance results showed that each factor and the interaction were clearly significant.  
Also, the Not Mission Capable Rate for Supply MOE failed the lack of fit test.  
Investigations into the higher order terms showed that the second order terms were 
appropriate to fit this MOE.  The results of this analysis are not shown.   
Figure 27 shows the plot of Mission Capable Rate for the three false alarm and 
PHM Levels.  The rates do not change significantly between the PHM levels but across 
the false alarm percentages there is a significant drop off of Mission Capable rate.  Figure 
28 shows that at five percent false alarms per scheduled sortie the ALS equipped aircraft 
performs worse than the baseline aircraft.  Of course, the false alarm is modeled as the 
worst case possible as discussed in the previous chapter with a part removed and replaced 
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for every false alarm.  In addition to this fact there is only one LRU on base for the 
Antenna and the MLPRF, meaning that the entire system is stressed by this false alarm 
modeling. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter exhibits the results of the simulation runs based on a baseline 
situation without an ALS and then the ALS two factor analysis displayed in Table 6.  
Figure 27 shows that an ALS equipped aircraft performs better than the baseline aircraft 
up to a point with increasing false alarm rates.  The cross over for Mission Capable rate 
occurs after a false alarm rate of 3%, while the Flying Scheduling Effectiveness was no 
better at the 3% level.  The Not Mission Capable for Maintenance rate drives the negative 
impact on overall Mission Capable rate.  This can be tied to the number of parts being 
removed and replaced with a higher false alarm rate.  As discussed in Chapter 3, 
troubleshooting, operations check, and documentation can be bypassed under an ALS but 
the time to remove and replace a LRU does not change.  This exhibits the importance of 
correctly identifying the correct LRU to remove and replace.  The assumption is made 
that the PHM correctly does that except for a false alarm. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
Introduction 
 The previous four chapters introduced the research that was undertaken, 
reviewed the literature, defined the model and all the different areas established to 
simulate the non-ALS and ALS sortie generation process, and analyzed the output of the 
results.  The research that has been described by these chapters investigated the impact of 
an ALS on the U.S. Air Force aircraft sortie generation process.  This chapter will wrap 
up this research, list lessons learned during this process, chronicle conclusions, and 
discuss future research areas.  It should be noted that the specific values reported for our 
MOEs are not necessarily representative of actual sortie generation capabilities since we 
are only explicitly modeling a single aircraft system.  However, the improvements in our 
selected MOEs with the introduction of the ALS, and sensitivities of these MOEs to 
variations in the ALS parameters, are representative of the kinds of impact we anticipate 
with a fully operational ALS. 
 
Autonomic Logistics Revisited    
The Autonomic Logistics concept can be summarized as processes and tools that 
automate the approach to the aircraft maintenance process allowing improved sortie 
generation capability with less logistics needs (Henley: 2000).  Under this concept 
aircraft maintenance tasks such as troubleshooting, parts ordering, and documentation 
would be fully automated allowing maintenance personnel to return aircraft to fully 
mission capable status more quickly with less effort.   
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Autonomic Logistics is still an emerging technology.  Currently only the US 
Army and Navy HUMS possess the capabilities that are approaching an automated state.  
The HUMS is being installed in operational helicopters at this time.   
 
Lessons Learned 
 There were numerous lessons learned during every portion of the research 
process.  Starting with the input analysis, the time between replacement data was 
formulated by hand from output from the REMIS database.  Tools are emerging that can 
perform these tasks automatically, this may be an area of future research.  The model 
building was extremely time consuming, and starting this process early in the research 
helped to allow changes in the later stages of design.  Documenting of the current model 
configuration and changes that were made to each newer version was also very helpful in 
the model building process.  Converting Arena® output files to text readable excel files   
could have been easier with the utilization of the Arena® file read and write module. 
 
Conclusion 
 The literature search indicated a great deal of research into the ALS concept.  It 
also showed that discrete event simulation sortie generation models exist, however, only 
one paper was discovered that discussed ALS simulation outside of the research 
conducted at AFIT by Capt Rebulanan and Capt Malley. 
The results of this research showed that the ALS equipped aircraft can perform 
better than a non-ALS aircraft up to a point.   The analysis from Chapter 4 shows an 8% 
improvement in Mission Capable rate from the baseline to the best factor combination for 
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ALS (FA = 1 / PHM Level = 5).  While the Flying Scheduling Effectiveness showed a 
2% improvement at those same factor levels.  At the other factor levels combinations the 
ALS performed marginally better or even worse then the non-ALS aircraft as shown in 
the Figures 28, 30, 32 and 34.  The false alarm affect on the MOEs was the most 
interesting and a little surprising.  Taking into consider that the design in this model was 
most likely the worst-case scenario, (part removal with every false alarm), it still provides 
an interesting example of an area of concern for the PHM designers.  If the maintenance 
personnel remove and replace a part that the ALS instructs them to, then this situation 
creates more RTOK for events for the depot which in turn stresses the supply system.  
CND and RTOK have existed for many years and the rates do not seem to be decreasing.  
Any new logistics concept should strive to decrease these rates.   
 
Recommendations for Further Study 
 A great deal of opportunities exist to make significant improvements of this sortie 
generation model, mostly in the PHM area.  The fact that a working system still does not 
exist, could lead to investigations into similar system designs like the HUMS or 
interviews with the Joint Strike Fighter SPO on preliminary designs, trying to determine 
their direction so far and future thoughts of what a system may resemble.  Studying the 
false alarms of previous systems and the actions taken by maintenance personnel could 
be further investigated.  How the maintenance personnel react to false alarms, at what 
point would they start ignoring the system or how could improvements be made to gain 
initial confidence in the system.   Research could be conducted on the process after a 
false alarm occurs.  Issues could be examined such as do you perform a remove and 
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replace of the LRU with every false alarm.  Also should this remove and replace action 
be based on the percentage of sorties as it was modeled or maybe a percentage of 
operating time.  Currently which LRU that is removed and replaced is based on an equal 
chance, maybe a better basis may be on the proportion of supply on base.  Another 
research avenue may be into the PHM assumptions such as no troubleshooting and no 
waiting for base supply.  Also, every DIS message was assumed to be received by supply.  
Modeling could be added that simulates dropped messages, slow message traffic, or 
downtimes.  Other issues about the timing of DIS messaging could be investigated, when 
is the information required, at landing or earlier while still in the landing pattern.   
One of the original goals of this research was to build the model to allow easy 
transition to an object-oriented model and provisions were made during the model 
building to allow that transition.  The entities in the model were treated like objects and 
were assigned attributes.  This could lead to possible further research using the JAVA® 
Silk® simulation package.   
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Appendix A. Baseline Runs 
 
Rates Baseline PHM2/5/0 PHM2/5/2 PHM2/5/5 PHM2/10/0 PHM2/20/2
MC 0.8001 0.8584 0.8584 0.8560 0.8462 0.8361 
NMCM 0.1407 0.1230 0.1234 0.1251 0.1310 0.1413 
NMCS 0.0592 0.0186 0.0182 0.0189 0.0228 0.0026 
FSE 0.9234 0.9368 0.9346 0.9234 0.9359 0.9359 
       
Rates PHM2/20/5 PHM2/10/2 PHM2/10/5 PHM2/20/0 PHM5/5/5  
MC 0.8381 0.8518 0.8480 0.8382 0.7877  
NMCM 0.1375 0.1276 0.1311 0.1380 0.1794  
NMCS 0.0244 0.0206 0.0209 0.0238 0.0329  
FSE 0.9342 0.9371 0.9325 0.9345 0.8916  
       
Rates PHM5/10/5 PHM5/20/5 PHM10/5/5 PHM10/10/5 PHM 10/20/5  
MC 0.7787 0.7619 0.6730 0.6513 0.6273  
NMCM 0.1847 0.1967 0.2595 0.2752 0.2941  
NMCS 0.0365 0.0415 0.0675 0.0735 0.0787  
FSE 0.9042 0.9024 0.8482 0.8548 0.8554  
 
   
84 
Appendix B. ANOVA Assumptions 
 
Mission Capable Rate 
ANOVA Assumptions 
Constant Variance 
SSR # X cols SSE n Breusch-Pagan Chi-square
3.57E-09 3 0.006741 270 1.907658683 0.992845
 
Independence 
Durbin-Watson 
Durbin-Watson Number of Obs. AutoCorrelation Prob<DW
2.0625877 270 -0.0323 0.6539
 
Influential Data Points 
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Studentized Residuals 
 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
 
Fitted Normal 
Parameter Estimates 
Type Parameter Estimate Lower 95% Upper 95%
Location Mu 0.000052 -0.119960 0.120063
Dispersion Sigma 1.001610 0.923652 1.094053
Goodness-of-Fit Test 
 Shapiro-Wilk W Test 
W Prob<W 
0.984409 0.5824 
   
85 
Flying Scheduling Effectiveness 
ANOVA Assumptions 
Constant Variance 
SSR # X cols SSE n Breusch-Pagan Chi-square
2.12E-10 3 0.000816 270 7.717642765 0.5628324
 
Independence 
Durbin-Watson 
Durbin-Watson Number of Obs. AutoCorrelation Prob<DW
2.0625877 270 -0.0323 0.6539
Influential Data Points  
Cook’s D 
-0.01
0
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Rows
 
Normality 
Studentized Residuals 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
 
Fitted Normal 
Parameter Estimates 
Type Parameter Estimate Lower 95% Upper 95%
Location Mu -0.00019 -0.120179 0.119803
Dispersion Sigma 1.00144 0.923491 1.093862
Goodness-of-Fit Test 
 Shapiro-Wilk W Test 
W Prob<W 
0.983523 0.5048 
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NMCM  
ANOVA Assumptions 
Constant Variance  
SSR # X cols SSE n Breusch-Pagan Chi-square
1.86E-09 3 0.003758 270 3.20308814 0.9556957
 
Independence  
Durbin-Watson 
 
 
 
Influential Data Point  
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Normality 
 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
 
Fitted Normal 
Parameter Estimates 
Type Parameter Estimate Lower 95% Upper 95%
Location Mu -0.00028 -0.120286 0.119728
Dispersion Sigma 1.00157 0.923617 1.094011
Goodness-of-Fit Test 
 Shapiro-Wilk W Test 
W Prob<W 
0.987636 0.8304 
Durbin-Watson Number of Obs. AutoCorrelation Prob<DW
1.9580986 270 0.0208 0.3214
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NMCS  
ANOVA Assumptions 
Constant Variance 
SSR # X cols SSE n Breusch-Pagan Chi-square
5.79E-10 3 0.001046 270 12.85914476 0.1690841
 
Independence 
Durbin-Watson 
Durbin-Watson Number of Obs. AutoCorrelation Prob<DW
2.115013 270 -0.0606 0.7960
Influential Data Points 
Cooks D 
-0.02
0
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Rows
 
Normality 
Studentized Residuals 
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4
 
Fitted Normal 
Parameter Estimates 
Type Parameter Estimate Lower 95% Upper 95%
Location Mu 0.000397 -0.119641 0.120434
Dispersion Sigma 1.001825 0.923850 1.094287
Goodness-of-Fit Test 
 Shapiro-Wilk W Test 
W Prob<W 
0.993117 0.9918 
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